THE BATTLE OF THE BERRE

THE GROUND
This maritime area is characterized by emerged grounds low height (50 cm with the plate of Cavettes) and marshy low grounds, due to the many alluvia carried by river Berre in this area of the littoral ; old gulf which in the beginning was made of three large islands : Saint Martin, l'Aute, Sainte-Lucie and a numerous of large stones.
The essential characteristic of this gulf is its constant and regular stranding during centuries. Its outlets on the sea always were, since highest antiquity, three from North towards the South: The Grau of Grazel, or Gruissan, Grau de Narbonne, or of the "Vieille Nouvelle", and the one of Port la Nouvelle.
The second one, who bears the name of the town of Narbonne, was employed intensely; it communicated with the ponds of Bages and Sigean and made possible the ships to reach the approaches located in the ponds.
It is allowable to think that the approach of Port-Mahon was used by the troops of the Arab army transported by sea, rather than the neighbouring beaches on the marshy ground lacking firmness, as well for the unloading of heavy burdens, like the various elements of the machines of war, as for the feet of the horses. An additional confirmation is provided by the death of Omar Ben Chaled to the plate of Cavettes, practically at the head of its landing.
The ponds occupied a surface much larger than today: below the current level of 5 meters the ground is perfectly flat, obvious sign of an old sea-bed, and partly nowadays occupied by vineyards or small marshes, but all of them fitted with drainage installations.
That does not want to say that this altitude represented the level of water at the time of the combat which occupies us: the process of stranding and raising of the grounds, compound with a weak maritime lowering, transformed this landscape.

A comparison with the Cassini's Chart, drawn between 1750 and 1814 obviously shows appreciable divergences with the littoral of the ponds such as it appears to us today; in particular an island, which existed two centuries ago, named the island of Mouisset, which is currently an eminence in open ground, carrying the point with altitude 13 meters (located at the East end of African Park enclosure...). One can thus admit that 13 centuries ago, the aspect of this area was different from today, not in his general state, but in particular for the usable approaches. Another particular point which has value of confirmation: surveys carried out in the salt works of Peyriac located the firm ground at 14 meters. One could thus continue to study the circumference of the initial gulf, what would do nothing but confirm what is written before.

The neighbouring hills close to the littoral are appreciably directed North-South and separated between them by more or less marked depressions, thus making possible in certain places to move parallel to the shore without being on its West side. The road network of the time in the North-South direction comprised three ways and a more significant number in the East-West direction. The three main roads of different importance, were West towards the East: 

·        The Via Domitia and, for the area which occupies us, its way from Fontfroide to Portel ;

·        The Way of the Coalmen, for the part ranging between Prat-de-Cest and Portel;

·        The way of the Salt Works (become the replacing Domitian way as from the 4th century, for the Villefalse to Narbonne section) approximately following the actual main road n° 9 from Narbonne to Perpignan.

But we must keep ourselves to establish a parallel between what we see of our road network and what it was at the time of Charles Martell: since the end of the Roman Empire, it was not maintained any more and was to offer only one poor platform, as gullied, planed and smashed as it could wish...

Finally, the Berre river, about which it is spoken so much here, is a torrent-like river : Eastern outfall of Corbières by the cluse of Ripaud, it takes its source at the Serre of Quintillan and has a length of approximately twenty miles. It runs initially in direction of North-North East until Ripaud then inflects its course towards the East and finishes in direction of the North-East. It flows into the pond of Sigean, North-East of the Hameau du Lac.

THE BATTLE
What Frédégaire (historiographer of the Merovingian dynasty) says: " From the city leaves a way which curves through the hills. On this boxed way, the Franks escape from the glances of the Arab watchers, posted very close to the Domitian way. Karl (Charles Martel) reached the village of Portel, from which a road leaves alongside Berre and leads to the Sea. In Villefalse where is a palate, he fords the river and arrives in contact with the enemy in full distress. The adversaries were run away and much drowned, they all were exterminated. The sea was far tinted with their blood ".
What the Anonymous of Cordoue (Arab historian) says: he compares "the troops of the warriors of Karl with a rampart of ice... Omar, entrusting in the quality of his position, had not taken any particular precaution".
The main thing is known as; but the extreme concision of the chroniclers of this time, for which all appears so obvious, must be interpreted as well as possible :
Frédégaire, in ten lines, camps a powerful action which put at the catches thousands of men. Very well-thought action, prepared and conducted until the total victory on the field. As for the Anonymous of Cordoue, it had all the reasons to be shown more discrete... To understand as well as possible the preparation and the development of this engagement, it is necessary to try to reconstitute the probable establishment of these two armies, the day before the battle and to penetrate the process of making use of the projected action. Because finally, the handling of many troops cannot escape from certain rules which govern in all times the laws of  war.

        Situation of  Charles' Army on Saturday
The frankish army had invested Narbonne closer to the fortifications, prohibiting any movement to besieged Moors. Moreover, as per rule in Campaign, each army is kept itself and, for this purpose, watching posts existed around the city, at a certain distance ordered by roads situation or remarkable access points of the ground, , comparable with alarm bells, charged in warning Charles of what occurred in its back. One of these bells was obligatorily with the threshold of Prat-de-Cest, obliged passage in the limit of ground compartment dominating the country towards the South and, very important given information, the threat coming from this direction.
We saw that the ground towards the South is enclosed between the littoral and the hills of Corbières, appreciably parallels between them.
In the North-South direction, it is characterized by two compartments of ground well delimited: The first goes from Narbonne to Prat-de-Cest (approximately 4miles ). The second, from Prat-of-Cest to the West South-South Col of Sigean (approximately 7,5 miles). Moreover, while placing himself on the East heights of Prat-de-Cest, at the coasts of Estarac which culminate to 112 meters and are very reachable while coming from North, it is possible to see the almost totality of the ponds, but also the Grau of the Vieille-Nouvelle, the "channel of the Romans", the plateau of Cavettes and the one of Gratias.
Here is thus the view-point very found: doubtless, Charles came on the spot and could conceive his battle plan from this place. It is possible to think that the East slopes of Fontfroide could also play the same part.
We saw he knew that the emir Okba wanted to make him raise the siege quickly, by his gathered army. This army could be only containing cavalry since Moslem, numerous, and that they would arrive by overland route; entraining of important troops is out of matter since they must arrive very quickly. All that surely confirmed by defectors spies, as there exists about it in any time or by the exceeded inhabitants of the warlike exactions which they underwent, without counting the interrogations of prisoners. He thus knew, undoubtedly, that the potential enemy would arrive of the South both by water and ground. Another source of information had to function: the fishermen, very many at the time, because two facts hold the attention :
It is known, at the time  the Arabs ran away themselves in direction of the ponds to join back their ships, that they were continued and killed by the Franks assembled on boats. Which, if not those found opportunely on the spot, i.e. those of the fishermen, whom nothing prevented from taking share with the action?
The second fact relates to the pilgrimage which the fishermen made after the battle, with Notre Dame des Oubiels at Portel, for a thanksgiving. No doubt that, with such feelings, Charles found on their side a mine of informations, quickly transmitted and highly exploitable.
Knowing that it would be attacked by an Arab army being able to be alerted by the many watch stations installed for the safety of the army, it had to make proceed to more remote recognitions, in order to see whether complementary indices appeared as for the enemy intentions. In the prescribed recognitions, the inventory of the various paths and ways was to appear in good place.

·        An idea of manoeuvre
Taking into account of what he learned from the enemy's intentions and the configuration of the ground, knowing by experiment it's always dangerous to have to fight on two fronts, in fact, his best way of defense was still to attack the troops of cavalry recently gathered, before the ships bringing the complement of equipment arrived and especially if he had knowledge of the Omar's landing : he had to deprive this one with his arrival of any head of bridge and to also prevent it from enlarging its forces.
Emerging with its troops from Prat-de-Cest, to go around Berre was out of question: what had played in his favour to indicate to him the arrival of the cavalry Moor would have also played against him. It was necessary for him thus to go towards the South, while being protected by the shelter of Corbières hills and what could be more normal than to use the old Domitian Way passing by Fontfroide which was not to be degraded still too much, though less used than in the past.
The distance to be covered by this road from Narbonne to Villefalse ford is about 14 miles, that is to say more than 5 hours by walk. Through the Way of the Coalmen it is roughly 10 miles, a little less than 4 hours. Some believed to see in the Way of the Coalmen "the way which curves between the hills" described by Frédégaire and which would have been used for Charles to go towards Portel.
This assumption cannot be retained for several obvious reasons : The passage to the threshold of Prat-de-Cest could not be dissimulated, the watchers posted on the Domitian Way would not have failed to locate this movement; moreover, two parts of this way are not masked to the Arab sight; the noises and the dust raised by a troop moving are not easily being hidden at that distance. This way does not curve between the hills, it is rather straight. It is difficult to think that, for a saving of time of less than two hours, while passing not easily unperceived, an informed chief as Charles compromises the effect of surprise, more paying for the continuation of the combat. Another practical aspect should not be ignored : fresh water. By the Domitian Way it had four water points: Fontfroide, Aragnon, Sainte-Eugénie and Portel. By the Way of the Coalmen the Franks had only Portel on the arrival and still, if the enemy did not occupy this village.

The history retained two actions of war, exactly similar, of total surprise of the adversary, due to a walk hidden by a movement of ground, which had not been occupied by the enemy, to emerge thus on its backs.
Needless to say that saturday in question, Charles knew what he wanted to do and a beginning of execution had to follow: troops advanced towards Fontfroide, marking out of the route to prevent any surprise, because it was necessary to be ready for the fight at the beginning of morning, with the most rested possible soldiers: the day would not fail to be hard.
The Anonymous of Tolède specifies, to undoubtedly excuse the defeat of his fellows, that the Frank warriors stand like "a wall of ice". What is to be retained from this comment? That all the Arab weapons slip on these warriors as on a frozen block and could not attack it, or although the stature, the relative immobility, the ferocity of Charles' troops froze with fear?

        Moors' situation on saturday
On the Arabs hand, let's take the same ways of analysis as previously, but which will be inevitably more summary :    

It is a compartment of ground which makes approximately 7 miles length on 2 broad between the littoral of the ponds and the first buttresses of Corbières, with a certain number of heights which not exceeds 70 meters, except at Portel where some hills culminate with more than 100 meters. The plateau which will see the clash of the two armies are 52 meters high in Cavettes and 32 in Gratias.
The rectified Domitian Way passes Berre to the ford of Villefalse and crosses at this place the way coming from large salt works, therefore from Port-Mahon to Portel while skirting the river.
Villefalse, " where there is a palate ", is also the closest point of the Domitian Way to the ponds and to Port-Mahon ,a practicable approach built a few centuries ago.

The Arabs, Masters of the country since 719, knew it well and it is with full knowledge of facts that the appointment was fixed at this place between Omar and his lieutenant which brought the mounted troops and the ships transporting war machineries and supplies. For the first, a way was necessary to convey them, the second being essential, because the region, traversed for a long time by troops, had been deserted by the inhabitants and food on a thin ground for thousands men and animals was out of question. This is the most probable as the fertile part of ground around Narbonne was occupied by Charles.
Port-Mahon made possible for ships coming from the sea via Grau de Narbonne to moor alongside a mole. (Some vestiges about it still remain nowadays); the stranding was then less pronounced, and the manoeuvring of the vessels was very easy.
The ground compartment finishes in North with Prat-de-Cest and the West with the heights dominating Portel culminating to 127 meters.
Two plateau of large surface are usable by many troops : Gratias which does not have less than 2,5 square meters of extent allows the gathering of at least 10 000 riders; Cavettes is three times wider.
Another detail which is of importance is that men and horses are large fresh water consumers and Berre river is alone of this dry area, measuring up to the needs of an army. Many low marshy points strewed the remainder of the area, not allowing any evolution. All the material conditions were necessary so that the Arab army stand at this place, because it was the most functional of the area.

Contrary to Charles, Omar did not seem to have been the first on the ground, having entrusted the cavalry to her lieutenant. This last, arrived at the meeting, must have received instructions to be discrete, to avoid attracting the Franks prematurely, which can explain the lack of demonstrations in various recognitions.
If information flowed towards Charles, that should not have been the case on the Arab side. It is true that the City was well buckled and raked surroundings. At all events, a fact is certain, he didn't know anything essential, otherwise he had no failed to hold account and to adopt another attitude and another device of it.Reverse to the franks' position, his one is a basin, with no sight in the neighbourhood, only by going to the edge of the ground compartment and to seek an observatory... Did he make it? What did he see in direction of the enemy? The threshold of Prat-de-Cest and a certain number of intermediate heights: Western side, hills of Corbières; East side, the ponds and some littoral heights. The minimum which he should have set up to keep himself initially, was to push a discrete recognition until the threshold of Prat-de-Cest, which in the scenery attracts all the glances, free not to be maintained there and to post, on the other hand, at Pech Blanc, intermediate height located at a throttling and obliged passage of the Domitian Way on the ponds side.
It should have put people on Bade Hill, East of Portel and would have thus controlled the run on the Way of the Coalmen, second penetrating in his plan of action. Did he make it? For the Pech Blanc, it is probable: Frédégaire speaks of Arab watchers posted along the Domitian Way.
For Bade, surely not because he would have detected the arrival of Charles, belatedly but with less surprise.
No doubt that the chief of this cavalry sinned largely against a military sacro-saint principle, which is to be informed as well as possible on the intentions of the enemy, in all times and all places. The only concern which worried him was to gather his troops and to go all forces joined together on the backs of Charles in front of Narbonne, to oblige him to fight and raise the siege, which would have allowed besieged to make an exit... It is well there the trap found out by Charles, the one he reduced to nothing by outstripping Omar while going to the Berre by indirectly way, without knowledge of the Moors. The Arab chief, trustful in the speed and the discretion of the movement of his ships and his cavalry, discounted that his enemy would learn it only tardily and that he would be unconstrained until he decides so. It is usefull to specify here that, Omar being away if this last were at sea as all lets it suppose, his lieutenant could not make much, if not the bare minimum, i.e. the conservation of troops in good condition for fight.
Without detecting any movement of the enemy, peacefulness settled in his army, undoubtedly tired. It was restored and bandaged the light wounds due to a rapid ride. Any frankish demonstration being much less probable that it was one Sunday and than Sarrazins well aware that this day, the Franks all were with their devotions...

·        The Troop
We saw that the Arab troops infiltrated as far as Provence either had been destroyed during various fights, or driven back towards Septimanie and besieged in Narbonne by Charles. It is well specified that Okba organized an army to free this city.
It is allowed to think that this new army coming from Spain didn't have, in its great majority, any previous contact with the frankish troops, known for their energy, their combativeness even their ferocity. The accounts of the veterans of Poitiers were, without any doubt, hawked in these new rows and that did not certainly contribute to cheer them up. What could be more natural then that surprise moulted in panic straight after the first fights, the absence of their immediate chiefs being in addition a factor of rout.
A part of the infantry and weapons servants arrived aboard ships, had not put foot at ground and could not intervene effectively. That could nothing remove with the individual bravery of the Moors soldier but, as from the beginning, the cards were so badly distributed that the fate of the battle could have not been so much different.

        Situation on sunday
Arabs
I think that it is there that the Frédégaire's  curious and laconic sentence takes all its meaning " he arrived earlier than expected ". This " He " can be addressed only to Omar, because only the chiefs were named, subalterns not very often and never the troop, who remained anonymous. It should be remembered that the chroniclers had to initially report the exploits of the Chief to whom they were personally attached.
Since the landing, he must prescribe two essential things:

* To proceed without delay to the landing of the troops, materials and supply which he brought. To help with these operations a part of the cavalry had been posted in Cavettes, dismounted men and horses stationed at some distance.

* To gather the various chiefs of the Army, to hear initially their voyage relation, which was known on the spot of the enemy, to specify his future intentions and to order a certain number of recognitions, because there could not be some discussion any more about remaining in the expectancy, as for the intentions of Charles.
The other part of the cavalry stationed in avant-garde on the plateau of Gratias, in charge of ensuring the covering of the landing and providing watchers, stationed along the Domitian Way.

Franks
Leaving Narbonne very early and, for some regiments, having perhaps started their movement the day before, here they are early in the morning around Portel ; undoubtedly, men and horses are refreshed in Berre and this troop is divided in two, to use the two banks of the river, thanks to the existing ford just downstream from the village.
It is the exit of the run, which lasts since the departure of Narbonne and, by no way, discovered by the enemy, quite obvious indication that he did not occupy the heights of Portel in particular, and that watchers had not been stationed in this direction.
This is the right moment chosen by Charles to make, with all his people, his unexpected appearance at the opening of Portel…
The road following the Berre towards Villefalse is used, but also the both banks and all the grounds close to the river, because the troop must arrive in mass and not diluted with the account-drop of a narrow ancient commercial road. All that is quickly raked in direction of the ponds. Don't forget, either, that the Frankish in hercynian forest did not have a road at their disposal and that the existence of this equipment was not essential for them to move.

Most probably, the Arab troops from the plateau of Gratias entered the first in contact with the frankish regiments from the left bank. The panic of this cavalry is easily explainable, if one thinks that it was dismounted and scattered, without main chiefs. This first contact turned into individual combats on foot, for which the Arabs had no taste, and the whole is imperceptibly thorough towards the pond of Déoumé (Dîme) and on the Domitian Way, northbound, destroyed or captured. It is not possible for them to join Cavettes, Berre and the marshes by prohibiting any approach; moreover, frankish troops on the right bank, overflowing and largely passing Villefalse, continue to sink "wedge like", cutting any way out of Gratias in this direction.
Of course, cries, calls of horns are heard fom Cavettes : Stopping landing, one runs to the horses, improvising.

But the Franks are here by numbers, a huge mass of people impressive and terrible : with no possible escape, it is necessary to fight the back with the shore or the marshes; many combatants throw themselves to water to join the boats awaiting their turn for unloading. Omar is killed… Once the Chief died, nobody's resisting anymore and they all ran away. The Franks borrow or take the boats opportunely found on the spot and continue carnage on waters of the ponds so much so that " The sea was far tinted with their blood " as per Frédégaire's account.
Many singular combats had to continue a good part of the day in the recesses of the ground. It is certain that, in spite of the assertion of a general slaughter, many Moslems had to succeed in fleeing and certainly the relation of the erection of an Arab monument at Ripaud, after the battle, which is not existing anymore, should only commemorate the death of an Arab prince killed at this place during the continuation. If not, why setting up a memorial of a battle at a situation where it did not take place, whereas the space missed by no means on the battlefield itself. What to think of troops engaged on both sides?
Uncertainty remains and it would be hazardous to advance numbers that nothing so far authorizes us to formulate. On a purely documentary basis, at the time of the battle of Toulouse in 721, where the Emir El Samh is killed, the Count Eudes writes to the Pope stating the extravagant number of 375 000 Moors killed. Obviously exaggerated number : the quarter seems already in extreme cases of the possible one. With Poitiers, total silence on the volume of the two armies. Same with Berre. That, for my opinion, would not be used besides for nothing, because the tactics adopted by the two parties couldn't modify the exit of the combat, compared to the importance of committed numbers.

CONCLUSION
Charles' battle plan was the right one : overcoming the cavalry before the arrival of Omar and his ships. The war hazard did that the latter arrived more quickly than expected and instead of being an unfavourable element for Charles, which he perhaps feared, it was his chance, because this landing was the cause of disorder in the Arab rows, at the most disadvantageous moment for them.
Charles was on the spot by extreme opportunity: chance or calculation? Undoubtedly both, because the victory belongs initially to the daring one.
The place where these two armies clashed thirteen centuries ago, practically remains in the same state. Not constructions nor important planimetric modifications. Rare privilege which it is advisable to appreciate in this century of overall upheavals. Also advantage over Poitiers, where the historical places are prone to controversy.

What could be more evocative and resting than to walk on the paths of these two plateau, in peacefullness, because the scenery is impressive and touching : lending an ear, it is not impossible that the imaginative ones could hear the noise of a bloody fray...

In 1382 the unpopular taxes imposed by Bernard of Armagnac cause the revolt of Tuchins (maybe from name of Tuchan, a village close to Narbonne). The tuchinat was a true jacquerie : Tuchins from the cities fought especially the Duke of Berry's men, but organized also resistance against English troops.

The insurrection was spread quickly in the seneschalsies of Narbonne, Béziers and Carcassonne, then in the Toulouse region, Rouergue, and as far as Auvergne, Limousin and Poitou.
 

Tuchins from the country attacked the castles of which they destroyed a great number, tackled nobles, clerks and the rich persons whom they massacred on their way.

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